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United States v. Greber and its Effect
on the Medicare and Medicaid
Programs*
INTRODUCTION
The Medicare and Medicaid health care programs were cre-
ated in the mid-1960s' in an attempt to ensure that all Americans
would receive high quality health care despite their inability to
pay.2 In 1965, Medicare and Medicaid services cost $5 billion.
By 1983, spending for these programs grew to $72 billion3 and
is projected to have exceeded $94.3 billion in fiscal year 1986.
4
The sheer magnitude of these programs has caused them to
become the objects of widespread fraud and abuse. Congress
has responded by enacting and revising anti-fraud and abuse
statutes in an effort to curb this waste of the tax-payers' dollars.
Initially, this Comment traces the legislative development of
the current sections of the Medicare-Medicaid 6 fraud7 and abuse"
* The author wishes to express his appreciation to Richard Plymale, Esquire of
Brown, Todd & Heyburn for his guidance in the preparation of this Comment.
See infra note 10.
Vance-Bryan, Afedicare's Prospective Payment System: Can Quality Care Sur-
vive? 69 IowA L. REv. 1417 (1984).
Kusserow, Civil Money Penalties Law of 1981: A New Effort to Confront Fraud
and Abuse in Federal Health Care Programs, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 985, 986 (1983).
' OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, SEMLANNUAL REPORT APR. 1-SEPT. 30, 1986
(1986).
, 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (1982).
Medicare provides basic protection against the costs of hospital, related post-
hospital, home health services, and hospice care for:
(1) individuals who are age 65 or over and are eligible for retirement
benefits under subchapter II of this chapter (or would be eligible for such
benefits if certain Federal employment were covered employment under
such subchapter) or under the railroad retirement system, (2) individuals
under age 65 who have been entitled for not less than 24 months to benefits
under subchapter II of this chapter (or would have been so entitled to such
benefits if certain Federal employment were covered employment under
such subchapter) or under the railroad retirement system on the basis of a
disability, and (3) certain individuals who did not meet the conditions
specified in either clause (I) or (2) but who are medically determined to
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statutes ["Kickback Statutes' ' 9] that prohibit the solicitation or
have end stage renal disease.
Id.
6 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1982).
The Medicaid program was adopted:
for the purpose of enabling each State, as far as practicable under the
conditions in such State, to furnish (1) medical assistance on behalf of
families with dependent children and of aged, blind, or disabled individuals,
whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary
medical services, and (2) rehabilitation and other services to help such
families and individuals attain or retain capability for independence or self-
care.
Id.
,Act of Oct. 25, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-142, 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADtir.
NEWS 3039, 3050.
Fraud involves an intentional deception or misrepresentation with the intent
of receiving some unauthorized benefit for the individual engaged in fraud.
In the health care area, examples of fraud may include: billing for services
not rendered, misrepresentation of services rendered, kickbacks, deliberate
duplicate billing, false or misleading entries on cost reports, and so forth.
Id.
, Id.
[A]buse ... includes activity wherein providers, practitioners, and suppliers
of services operate in a manner inconsistent with accepted, sound medical
or business practices resulting in excessive and unreasonable financial cost
to either medicare or medicaid. Also included are the provisions of unnec-
essary health services and necessary health services in unnecessarily costly
settings.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b) provides:
(1) Whoever knowingly and willfully solicits or receives any remuner-
ation (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly,
overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind-
(A) in return for referring an individual to a person for the
furnishing or arranging for the furnishing of any item or service for
which payment may be made in whole or in part under this subchapter,
or
(B) in return for purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging for
or recommending purchasing, leasing, or ordering any good, facility,
service, or item for which payment may be made in whole or in part
under this subchapter, shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction
thereof, shall be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not
more than five years, or both.
(2) Whoever knowingly and willfully offers or pays any remuneration
(including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or
covertly, in cash or in kind to any person to induce such person-
(A) to refer an individual to a person for the furnishing or ar-
ranging for the furnishing of any item or service for which payment
may be made in whole or in part under this subchapter, or
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receipt of kickbacks, bribes, or rebates. Second, this Comment
(B) to purchase, lease, order, or arrange for or recommend pur-
chasing, leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service, or item for
which payment may be made in whole or in part under this subchapter,
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined
not more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or
both.
(3) Paragraphs (1) and (2) shall not apply to-
(A) a discount or other reduction in price obtained by a provider
of services or other entity under this subchapter if the reduction in price
is properly disclosed and appropriately reflected in the costs claimed or
charges made by the provider or entity under this title, and
(B) any amount paid by an employer to an employee (who has a
bona fide employment relationship with such employer) for employment
in the provision of covered items or services.
42 U.S.C. § 1396h(b) provides:
(I) Whoever knowingly and willfully solicits or receives any remuner-
ation (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly,
overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind-
(A) in return for referring an individual to a person for the
furnishing or arranging for the furnishing of any item or service for
which payment may be made in whole or in part under this subchapter,
or
(B) in return for purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging for
or recommending purchasing, leasing, or ordering any good, facility,
service, or item for which payment may be made in whole or in part
under this subchapter, shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction
thereof, shall be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not
more than five years, or both.
(2) Whoever knowingly and willfully offers or pays any remuneration
(including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or
covertly, in cash or in kind to any person to induce such person-
(A) to refer an individual to a person for the furnishing or ar-
ranging for the furnishing of any item or service for which payment
may be made in whole or in part under this subchapter, or
(B) to purchase, lease, order, or arrange for or recommend pur-
chasing, leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service, or item for
which payment may be made in whole or in part under this subchapter,
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined
not more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or
both.
(3) Paragraphs (1) and (2) shall not apply to-
(A) a discount or other reduction in price obtained by a provider
of services or other entity under this subchapter if the reduction in price
is properly disclosed and appropriately reflected in the costs claimed or
charges made by the provider or entity under this subchapter, and
(B) any amount paid by an employer to an employee (who has a
bona fide employment relationship with such employer) for employment
in the provision of covered items or services.
1986-871
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examines two periods when the courts expanded the scope of
the Kickback Statutes and analyzes the effect of this expansion
on the present Medicare-Medicaid programs following the intro-
duction of a new reimbursement plan. Finally, this Comment
concludes that, until the Judicial branch renders decisions con-
sistent with the Medicare-Medicaid sections governing the meth-
ods and means of health care delivery, the Medicare-Medicaid
programs will be unable to provide assistance to those persons
whom the programs were designed to help.
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
From their creation in 1965 under the Social Security Act, 10
the Medicare-Medicaid programs have been the targets of many
fraud and abuse schemes. 1" Unfortunately, the Social Security
Act originally contained only one penalty provision, 42 U.S.C.
section 1307(a), which related solely to the making of false
statements or misrepresentations Df material fact. A conviction
under 42 U.S.C. section 1307(a) was a misdemeanor carrying a
penalty of a maximum fine of $1,000, a term of imprisonment
of not more than one year, or both. 13 Prosecutors often were
unsuccessful in obtaining convictions of abuses of the Social
Security Act because of the limited nature of prohibited conduct
1o 42 U.S.C. ch. 7 (1982).
' Fiske, Medicare and Medicaid Fraud, 18 Am. Csui. L. REv. 286, 288-89 (1980).
[FIraud involves intentionally billing for services not rendered, and includes
excessive billing, kickbacks, and providing false identification on reim-
bursement forms. Abuse refers to activities including "ping-ponging" (the
referral of patients to other doctors in the same building), "gang visits"
(billing for multiple services), and "steering" (directing a patient to a
particular pharmacy).
Id.
12 42 U.S.C. § 1307(a) (1982) provides:
Whoever, with the intent to defraud any person, shall make or cause
to be made any false representation concerning the requirements of this
chapter, subchapter E of chapter 1 or subchapter A, C, or E of chapter 9
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, or of any rules or regulations issued
thereunder, knowing such representations to be false, shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished
by a fine not exceeding $1,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding one
year, or both.
13 Id.
[Vol. 75
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under 42 U.S.C. section 1307(a). 14 Therefore, prosecutors began
prosecuting under general federal criminal statutes. 5 The pros-
ecutor's task was difficult, however, because the more useful
criminal statutes required not only that the prohibited conduct
4 Yoakum, Physicians Fraud in the Medicare-Medicaid Programs: Kickbacks,
Bribes, and Remunerations, 10 MEM. ST. U.L. REv. 684, 685 n.6 (1980) (citing State v.
Fellman, 193 N.W.2d 775 (Neb. 1972), illustrating the difficulties of prosecution based
on false pretenses due to the requirement that the state prove a specific intent to cheat
or defraud).
' See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982):
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against
the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof
in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do
any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more
than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of
the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy
shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for such misdemeanor.
18 U.S.C. § 286 (1982):
Whoever enters into any agreement, combination, or conspiracy to
defraud the United States or any department or agency thereof, by obtain-
ing or attempting to obtain the payment or allowance of any false, fictitious
claim, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than
10 years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 287 (1982):
Whoever makes or presents [claims] to any person or officer ... of
the United States, or any department or agency thereof, knowing such
claims to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent, shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982):
Whoever, in any manner within the jurisdiction of any department or
agency of the United States knowingly and willingly falsifies, conceals or
covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any
false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or
uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false,
fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not more than
S10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982):
Whoever, having devised or intended to devise any scheme or artifice
to defraud or for obtaining money or property by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations or promises ... for purposes of
executing such scheme or artifice or attempting to do so, places in any
post office or authorized depository for such matter.., or takes or receives
therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered
by mail ... shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more
than 5 years, or both.
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be performed "knowingly" and/or "willingly,' '1 6 but also that
this "mens rea' '1 7 be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.'8
When it became apparent that prosecutors were having dif-
ficulty utilizing statutes not specifically designed to prevent fraud
within the Medicare-Medicaid programs, 9 Congress added sec-
tions 1877(b) and 1909(b) (hereinafter the "original Kickback
Statutes") in the Social Security Act Amendments of 1972.20 The
.6 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 287, 1001, 1341 (cited supra note 15).
11 Mens rea is "A guilty mind; a guilty or wrongful purpose; a criminal intent."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 889 (5th ed. 1979).
,1 See, e.g., United States v. Mekjian, 505 F.2d 1320, 1324 (5th Cir. 1975). The
court held that the indictment, under which the defendant was convicted of 60 counts
of filing fraudulent Medicare claims, was invalid because it failed to allege that the
conduct was performed "willfully." Id.
The statute uses both "willingly" and "knowingly" in defining the offense.
Each encompasses a different element of the requisite mens rea, requiring
different proof. "Knowingly" under sec. 1001 requires that a defendant
acted "with knowledge." [citation omitted] "Willfully" under sec. 1001
requires proof that a defendant acted "deliberately," or "deliberately and
with knowledge." [citation omitted] Each must be proved beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, as the district court recognized by so instructing the jury.
Id. (emphasis in original).
19 Yoakum, supra note 14, at 686. "Congress responded to the need for specific
legislation to combat Medicare and Medicaid fraud in 1972 by passing penalty statutes
which directly prohibited these corrupt activities." Id.
20 Act of Oct. 30, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 1877(b), 86 Stat. 1329, 1972 U.S.
CODE CONG. & Agrnmw. Naws 1548, 1659 provides:
Whoever furnishes items or services to an individual for which pay-
ment is or may be made under this title and who solicits, offers, or receives
any-
(1) kickback or bribe in connection with the furnishing of such
items or services or the making or receipt of such payment, or
(2) rebate of any fee or charge for referring any such individual
to another person for the furnishing of such items or services,
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year,
or both.
Id. at 1660 provides:
Whoever furnishes items or services to an individual for which pay-
ment is or may be made in whole or in part out of Federal funds under a
State plan approved under this title and who solicits, offers, or receives
any-
(1) kickback or bribe in connection with the furnishing of such items
or services or the making or receipt of such payment, or
(2) rebate of any fee or charge for referring any such individual
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original Kickback Statutes solved two problems for prosecutors
by: (1) eliminating the requirement that prosecutors prove that
the prohibited conduct was performed "knowingly" and/or
"willingly"; 2' and (2) expanding the conduct prohibited under
the Social Security Act to include the solicitation, offer, or
acceptance of any kickback22 or bribe.23 A conviction under
either original Kickback Statute could result in a fine of up to
$10,000, a term of imprisonment of not more than one year, or
both.
24
When the original Kickback Statutes were presented to Con-
gress as a legislative solution to the prosecutors' dilemma, the
House Ways and Means Reporting Committee stressed that pub-
lic confidence in the integrity of the Medicare-Medicaid pro-
grams had to be maintained.2 - The adoption of the original
Kickback Statutes facilitated this by providing "penalties for
certain practices which have long been regarded by professional
organizations as unethical, as well as unlawful in some jurisdic-
tions, and which contribute appreciably to the cost of the Med-
icare-Medicaid programs.' '26 The original Kickback Statutes also
were intended to facilitate the vigorous prosecution of "every
person attempting by unlawful means to obtain payments not
due him under the plan. .. .27 Thus, cases were not to be
dropped because of high prosecution costs, even if the amount
of money to be recovered was small.28
to another person for the furnishing of such items or services, shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
Id. Note the absence of the words "knowingly" and "willingly."
"Kickback" is defined in WEBSTER'S TBIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
(1966) as "a percentage paymnt . . for granting assistance by one in a position to
open up or control a source of income" (cited in United States v. Perlstein, 632 F.2d
661, 663 (6th Cir. 1980)). See infra note 59.
2' A bribe has been defined as "an attempt to influence another to disregard his
duty while continuing to appear devoted to it or to repay trust with disloyalty." United
States v. Zacher, 586 F.2d 912, 915 (6th Cir. 1980) (citing United States v. Esperdy, 285
F.2d 341, 342 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 905 (1961)). See infra note 45.
: See supra note 20.
2 Act of Oct. 30, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 4989, 5176.
Id.
- Id.
See id.
1986-871
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
Nevertheless, the original Kickback Statutes failed to signif-
icantly deter the illegal practices in Medicare-Medicaid pro-
grams. 29 Prosecutors initially were reluctant to use the original
Kickback Statutes because they were unfamiliar with the Medi-
care-Medicaid programs and because they preferred not to pros-
ecute well-known local doctors, hospitals, and nursing homes.
3 0
Additionally, the original Kickback Statutes contained only
misdemeanor penalties which were inconsistent with other federal
criminal code provisions which also punished the submission of
false claims or the solicitation, offer, or acceptance of a bribe
or kickback as felonies. 31 The original Kickback Statutes' failure
to deter illegal practices was evident when in 1978, the Comp-
troller General of the United States estimated that one to ten
percent (1% - 10%) of federal funds spent on Medicaid 2 were
lost through fraud.3 3 The discovery of multi-million dollar fraud
schemes in California, Illinois and New York in the mid-1970s
is illustrative of the graft which resulted in the Comptroller's
figures.34
2 Act of Oct. 25, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-142, 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADnN.
NEWS 3039, 3055.
Existing law provides specific penalties under the medicare and med-
icaid programs for certain practices that have long been regarded by
professional organizations as unethical, which are unlawful in some juris-
dictions, and which contribute significantly to the cost of the pro-
grams....
Recent hearings and reports, however, indicate that such penalties
have not proved adequate deterrents against illegal practices by some
individuals who provide services under medicare and medicaid.
Id.
30 Plymale, Medicare and Medicaid Fraud and Abuse, HEALTH CARE Sym, osni
N-5 (1986).
31 See Act of Oct. 25, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-142, 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM:N.
NEws 3039, 3055. "[T]hese misdemeanor penalties appear inconsistent with existing
Federal criminal code sanctions which make similar actions punishable as felonies." Id.
3 Laudicina & Schneider, The Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amend-
ments of 1977: Implications for the Poor, 11 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 843, 843 (1978).
Between 1965 and 1977, Medicare and Medicaid expenditures amounted to $39.2 billion.
11 See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED
STATES BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 9 (1978) (cited in Kusserow,
Civil Money Penalties Law of 1981: A New Effort to Confront Fraud and Abuse in
Federal Health Care Programs, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 985, 985 n.2 (1983)).
-' See Plymale, supra note 30, at N-5. The New York Attorney General's investi-
gation into Medicaid fraud led him to estimate that nursing homes in New York had
overcharged the Medicaid system up to $70 million since 1965.
[Vol. 75
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In response to this widespread fraud and abuse, Congress
passed the Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amend-
ments of 1977 (hereinafter the "amended Kickback Statutes").'5
" Act of Oct. 25, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-142, § 1877(b), 91 Stat. 1175, 1180 (1977)
(current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (1982)) provides:
(1) Whoever solicits or receives any remuneration (including any kick-
back, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash
or in kind-
(A) in return for referring an individual to a person for the
furnishing or arranging for the furnishing of any item or service for
which payment may be made in whole or in part under this subchapter,
or
(B) in return for purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging for
or recommending purchasing, leasing, or ordering any good, facility,
service, or item for which payment may be made in whole or in part
under this subchapter, shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction
thereof, shall be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not
more than five years, or both.
(2) Whoever offers or pays any remuneration (including any kickback,
bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in
kind to any person to induce such person-
(A) to refer an individual to a person for the furnishing or ar-
ranging for the furnishing or service for which payment may be made
in whole or in part under this subchapter, or
(B) to purchase, lease, order, or arrange for or recommend pur-
chasing, leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service, or item for
which payment may be made in whole or in part under this subchapter,
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined
not more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or
both.
(3) Paragraphs (I) and (2) shall not apply to-
(A) a discount or other reduction in price obtained by a provider
of services or other entity under this subehapter if the reduction in price
is properly disclosed and appropriately reflected in the costs claimed or
changes made by the provider or entity under this title, and
(B) any amount paid by an employer to an employee (who has a
bona fide employment relationship with such employer) for employment
in the provision of covered items or services.
Act of Oct. 25, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-142, § 1909(b), 91 Stat. 1175, 1181 (1977) (current
version at 42 U.S.C. § 1396h(b) (1982)) provides:
(1) Whoever solicits or receives any remuneration (including any kick-
back, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash
or in kind-
(A) in return for referring an individual to a person for the
furnishing or arranging for the furnishing of any item or service for
which payment may be made in whole or in part under this subchapter,
or
(B) in return for purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging for
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 75
These amendments further expanded the breadth of the Social
Security Act by prohibiting the solicitation or receipt of remu-
neration, in addition to kickbacks, bribes, or rebates.36 "Re-
muneration," a more comprehensive term, was included to
eliminate problems of proving that a kickback, bribe, or rebate
took place, thus making all forms of improper payment illegal.
1
7
Additionally, to encourage compliance, a violation of the
amended Kickback Statutes was elevated to a felony, resulting
or recommending purchasing, leasing, or ordering any good, facility,
service, or item for which payment may be made in whole or in part
under this subchapter, shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction
thereof, shall be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not
more than five years, or both.
(2) Whoever offers or pays any remuneration (including any kickback,
bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in
kind to any person to induce such person-
(A) to refer an individual to a person for the furnishing or ar-
ranging for the furnishing of any item or service for which payment
may be made in whole or in part under this subchapter, or
(B) to purchase, lease, order, or arrange for or recommend pur-
chasing, leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service, or item for
which payment may be made in whole or in part under this subchapter,
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined
not more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or
both.
(3) Paragraphs (1) and (2) shall not apply to-
(A) a discount or other reduction in price obtained by a provider
of services or other entity under this subchapter if the reduction in price
is properly disclosed and appropriately reflected in the costs claimed or
charges made by the provider or entity under this subchapter, and
(3) any amount paid by an employer to an employee (who has a
bona fide employment relationship with such employer) for employment
in the provision of covered items or services.
36 United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68, 71 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 396
(1985). While citing WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTiONARY (1966) definition
of "remuneration" as an action "to pay an equivalent for service," the Third Circuit
stated that because the statute included the terms kickback and bribe, it expanded
"remuneration" to cover situations where no service is performed. Id. The court further
stated that remuneration "includes not only sums for which no actual service was
performed but also those amounts for which some professional time was expended."
Id.
3 United States v. Stewart Clinical Laboratory, Inc., 652 F.2d 804, 806 (9th Cir.
1981). "The amendments, therefore, shift the focus of the operative distinction between
the subsections from the type of payoff involved to the nature of the referred Medicare
or Medicaid business-individuals or services." Id. See infra notes 45-53 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of the problems of proof in the original Kickback Statutes.
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in a fine of up to $25,000, a term of imprisonment of not more
than five years, or both.35
The amended Kickback Statutes were intended to clarify the
illegal types of financial arrangements and conduct prohibited
under Medicare and Medicaid, thus facilitating their enforce-
ment.39 Urging the passage of the 1977 amendments, Senator
Robert Dole stated: "The extent of fraud and abuse in these
programs is widespread. In the past, our attempts to control
these problems have met with limited success. This bill provides
us with an opportunity to wage a stronger battle, with stronger
weapons at our disposal." 4 Senator Herman Talmadge stated
that these amendments were "an opportunity for the Congress
to give a clear, loud signal to the thieves and the crooks and
See supra note 35 at 1180.
' See supra note 7 at 3041.
The most common violations ... include:
(1) "ping-ponging"-referring of patients from one practitioner
to another within the facility even though there is no medical reason
for doing so;
(2) "ganging"-billing for multiple services to relatives who ac-
company a family member who alone had sought treatment at the [facility].
(3) "upgrading"-billing for a service more extensive than that
actually provided;
(4) "steering"-directing a patient to a particular pharmacy, a
violation of the medicaid program's policy of freedom of choice; and
(5) billing for services not rendered-either added services not
performed onto an invoice carrying legitimate billings or submitting a
totally fraudulent claim.
Other violations include soliciting, offering, or receiving kickbacks;
billing twice or more for the same service; and billing both medicare and
medicaid for the same service.
Fee splitting and percentage lease arrangements are common practices
and often go hand-in-hand with medicaid mills. Percentage lease arrange-
ments are a basic economic incentive to form these facilities. Percentage
lease arrangements give the landlord a percentage of the provider's gross
income in return for office, space, equipment, shared waiting rooms,
laboratory services, custodial and office help, and often administrative
services. ...
Factoring is also a very common practice associated with medicaid
mills. Although factoring was outlawed under the Social Security Amend-
ments of 1972, factoring firms have evaded statutory intent by working
under a power of attorney arrangement.
Id. at 3048.
"' 123 CONG. REc. S31770 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1977) (statement of Sen. Dole).
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the abusers that we mean to call a halt to their exploitation of
the public and the public purse."
'4'
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE AMENDED KICKBACK
STATUTES
Although prosecutors were reluctant to vigorously pursue
convictions under the original Kickback Statutes, 42 Congress'
1977 call for a halt to the exploitation of the public purse,
43
coupled with the recent revelations of widespread exploitation,
prompted prosecutors to increase the number of investigations
of fraudulent medical practices and to obtain more convictions
under the amended Kickback Statutes."
The problems faced by prosecutors under the original Kick-
back Statutes are illustrated by United States v. Zacher,45 in
which the Second Circuit reversed the defendant's conviction by
narrowly interpreting the language of the statute. The court held
that there was "no showing that 'bribe' in section 1396h(b)
(1972) was intended to encompass more than at common law or
in common usage .... -46 In United States v. Porter,47 the Fifth
41 123 CONG. REc. S31767 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1977) (statement of Sen. Talmadge).
42 Plymale, supra note 30, at N-5.
41 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
, Fiske, supra note 11, at 288 n.1007 (citing Sept. 12, 1980 interview with Dr.
Robert Wilson, Public Affairs Assistant to the Inspector General of the Department of
Health and Human Services). In 1979, prosecutors obtained 288 convictions resulting
from both state and federal investigations. In 1980, state Medicaid fraud control units
in 31 states investigated approximately 2,100 cases of fraud. Id.
1" 586 F.2d 912 (2d Cir. 1978). Zacher ran a nursing home and charged his private
paying residents $29.00 per day. If a patient's insurance paid only $25.00 per day,
Zacher required the patient's family to pay the $4.00 difference. Id. at 913. The Second
Circuit found that, without the element of corruption, the supplemental payments did
not constitute bribes. Id. at 917. The court noted that the payments to Zacher did not
increase the cost to the government, decrease the quality of health care purchased, or
involve a misapplication of government funds. Id. at 916. Zacher's activities occurred
in 1973 and 1974. He had been convicted of violating 42 U.S.C. § 1396h(b) (1972). Id.
at 913.
4 Id. at 917.
- 591 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 625 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1980). When a
doctor chose to send blood samples to certain laboratories, the court upheld the doctor's
right to receive "handling fees" from the laboratory and classified the payments as
legitimate and not as kickbacks. Id. at 1054. Porter's activities occurred in 1973, 1974
and 1975. He was convicted of violating 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)(1) as amended in 1972.
Id. at 1052.
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Circuit also reversed a lower court conviction under the original
Kickback Statute based on a narrow definition of the term
"kickback. ' 48 The court found that no kickback existed because
(1) the defendants were not public officials having their judgment
corrupted,49 (2) the funds received were not funds being returned
to an earlier possessor, 0 and (3) the defendants were not persons
on whom Congress had imposed a specific duty.s' The Fifth
Circuit reasoned that, if the 1977 amendments were necessary to
clarify 2 the language of 42 U.S.C. sections 1395nn and 1396h,
"then we are hard put to say, with that degree of confidence
required in a criminal conviction, that these defendants were
given clear warning by that statute that their conduct was pro-
hibited by it, thus amounting to a criminal act." 53
Except for the narrow interpretations of the original Kick-
back Statutes in the Zacher and Porter decisions, the trend in
the judiciary, between 1977 and 1980, was to support the stated
intent of Congress5 4 by expanding the Kickback Statutes. A series
of decisions in the Sixth and Seventh Circuits evidences this
trend.." The first expansionary step was to establish a broad
definition of the term "kickback, ' 56 thereby prohibiting more
". "[A] kickback is the secret return to an earlier possessor of part of a sum
received." Id. at 1054 (emphasis in original).
0 Id.
Id.
"Id.
2 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
' 591 F.2d at 1054.
" See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 56-69 and accompanying text. The Sixth Circuit decided United
States v. Perlstein, 632 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1980) and United States v. Tapert, 625 F.2d
111 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1034 (1980), aff'g, United States v. Weingarden,
468 F. Supp. 410 (E.D. Mich. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1034 (1980). The Seventh
Circuit decided United States v. Hancock, 604 F.2d 999 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 991 (1979) and United States v. Ruttenberg, 625 F.2d 173 (7th Cir. 1980).
" See United States v. Weingarden, 468 F.2d 410, 413-14 (E.D. Mich. 1979) for
an excellent discussion of cases construing "kickback" (citing In re Grand Jury Pro-
ceedings, 570 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1978); ITT Community Dev. Corp. v. Barton, 569 F.2d
1351 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Godwin, 566 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1978); Mahew v.
Hughes Tool Co., 569 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Foster, 566 F.2d 1045
(6th Cir. 1977) (defendant bank officers, authorized to make loans on behalf of the
bank, took "kickbacks" from borrowers of bank loans when a portion of the loan
proceeds were paid to the defendants); United States v. Beasley, 550 F.2d 261 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 938 (1977); United States v. Joseph, 533 F.2d 282 (5th Cir. 1976),
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kinds of conduct.5 7 Even gratuitous gifts, the funds for which
did not originate from federal sources, were included in the
definition .5  Ultimately, kickbacks could be payments given to
persons in control of federal funds because of the potential
creation of increased costs to the government. 9
In United States v. Hancock,60 the Seventh Circuit held that
"handling fees," received for services rendered, were illegal kick-
backs. 6' The defendants in Hancock were doctors who prepared
samples for shipment to a laboratory and received a percentage
of the laboratory's Medicaid receipts for preparing the samples
for testing.62 The laboratory billed Medicaid directly for its own
services and included in its bill the cost for the services per-
formed by the defendants . 3 After receiving its reimbursement
from Medicaid, the laboratory paid the defendants for their
services. 4 This reimbursement from the laboratory to the doctors
was deemed a kickback"5 by the court, which stated:
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 905 (1977); United States v. Bush, 503 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1974);
United States v, Thompson, 366 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1966) (defendant city council members
soliciting a particular architectural firm for the construction of a hospital were deemed to
have requested a 1% "kickback" payment from the firms).
11 See 604 F.2d at 1001. The acceptance of "handling fees" by a doctor from a
laboratory, for the actual services of obtaining, packaging, and sending specimens, was
included as prohibited conduct. The court noted that "the potential for increased costs
to the Medicare-Medicaid system and misapplication of federal funds is plain where
payments for the exercise of such judgments are added to the legitimate costs of the
transaction." Id.
11 625 F.2d at 177. In the case, defendants, nursing home operators, were paid
$3.00 each month by a pharmacist, from his own private resources, for the opportunity
to provide pharmaceutical services to each public aid patient in the nursing home. Id.
at 176. Convictions for accepting kickbacks under 42 U.S.C. § 1396h(b)(l) were affirmed
because the payments were made to a person in control of federal funds. Id. at 177.
" See United States v. Perlstein, 632 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1980). The defendant,
Perlstein, operated a nursing home primarily for Medicaid patients. For the opportunity
of servicing the pharmaceutical and physical therapy needs of the residents, Perlstein
demanded that the supplier of those services give him $416 worth of alcoholic beverages
every month. Id. at 662. The defendant's convictions were affirmed because the supplier
of services was selected for no other reason than that he made payments to the nursing
home administrator. Id. at 663.
10 604 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1979).
61 Id. See infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
604 F.2d at 1001.
63 Id.
6 Id.
Id. at 1002.
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[T]he element of corruption is found in this allegation that the
defendants received payments in return for their decision to
send specimens to Chem-Tech. The potential for increased
costs to the Medicare-Medicaid system and misapplication of
federal funds is plain, where payments for the exercise of such
judgments are added to the legitimate costs of the transaction."
The definition of kickback adopted in Hancock,67 and followed
in United States v. Perlstein,68 reads: "a percentage payment
... for granting assistance by one in a position to open up or
control a source of income."
'69
The Hancock decision is an example of the unjust results
which prompted Congress to acknowledge the potential for crim-
inal prosecution of individuals whose conduct, while "im-
proper," was inadvertent. 70 Thus, in 1980, Congress amended
the Social Security Act, 71 again requiring that conduct be per-
formed "knowingly" and "willfully" 72 before it is deemed ille-
gal. Ironically, one of the purposes for adopting the original
Kickback Statutes was to assist prosecutors by eliminating just
such a requirement.73 Therefore, although the 1980 amendment,
through its silence, endorses the 1977-1980 period of judicial
expansion of the amended Kickback Statutes to cover all types
of economic inducement for referrals, it must also be seen as an
attempt by Congress to restrict that expansion by adding the
requirement that specific intent be proven in each instance.
Even though Congress obviously was attempting to rein in
the application of the amended Kickback Statutes, the judiciary
Id. at 1001.
Id. at 1002.
632 F.2d 661, 663 (6th Cir. 1980).
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1966) (cited in 632 F.2d at
663; 604 F.2d 1002).
" Act of Dec. 5, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmaN.
NEWS 5526, 5572. "This section provides that criminal penalties for solicitation or
payment of kickbacks, bribes, rebates, or other remuneration in exchange for Medicare
or Medicaid business apply only in cases where such conduct is undertaken knowingly
and willfully." Id.
I /d.
,2 See supra note 9.
" Yoakum, supra note 14, at 686 n.8. Prosecutors were required to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that violations were knowingly and willingly performed.
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responded only temporarily. 74 Following the 1980 amendment,
the Ninth Circuit decided the case of United States v. Stewart
Clinical Laboratory, Inc.,75 in which the court adhered to Con-
gress' intent to restrict the application of the amended Kickback
Statutes' by finding that an indictment under one subsection of
the amended Kickback Statutes would not support a conviction
based on evidence applicable to a different subsection of the
amended Kickback Statutes. 76 After the Stewart Clinical Labo-
ratory, Inc. decision, however, the Ninth Circuit issued a series
of opinions7" which began re-expanding the scope of the Kick-
back Statutes as amended in 1980 (hereinafter the "existing
Kickback Statutes") by upholding convictions that would have
been reversed under Congress' more limited intent analysis, as
reflected in Stewart.78
The Ninth Circuit's expansion of the amended Kickback
Statutes following Congress' 1980 amendment was accomplished
by employing methods similar to those used successfully by the
Sixth and Seventh Circuits between 1977 and 1980. 79 The Ninth
Circuit broadly defined the terms used in the amended Kickback
74 See infra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
Is 652 F.2d 804, 806-07 (9th Cir. 1981). The Ninth Circuit read the indictment
narrowly and overturned the conviction, deciding that the charge stated in the indictment
did not fall within the terms of the statute. The defendants were charged with violating
42 U.S.C. § 1396h(b)(2)(A) (the payment of remuneration for the referral of an individ-
ual), but the proof offered at trial sought to establish a violation of 42 U.S.C. §
1396h(b)(2)(B) (the payment of remuneration for the referral of services, including
laboratory work). Id. at 805.
76 Id. at 807.
7 See infra notes 79-83. The Ninth Circuit decided United States v. Universal
Trade and Indus., Inc., 695 F.2d 1151 (9th Cir. 1983) (affirmed conviction for offering
remuneration in return for the referral of services); United States v. Fekri, 650 F.2d 1044
(9th Cir. 1981) (conviction for offering 10% rebate on medicare and Medi-Cal collections
affirmed due to lack of evidence to establish entrapment and because no objection was raised
to the variance between indictment and proof. There was no prejudice and the error was
merely in the citation); United States v. Duz-Mor Diagnostic Laboratory, Inc., 650 F.2d
223 (9th Cir. 1981) (proposing a 15% rebate in exchange for the referral of medicare and
Medi-Ca business meets the standard of an "offer" of a bribe or kickback as proscribed
by federal statutes and the narrower contract definition of "offer" does not control).
78 See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
71 See supra note 55.
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Statutes 0 and broadly construed indictments so that the charged
conduct qualified as conduct prohibited under the amended
Kickback Statutes. 81 Although not specifically reversing its hold-
ing in Stewart Clinical Laboratory, Inc., the Ninth Circuit later
held, in a similar fact situation, that the sections of the Kickback
Statutes "are not mutually exclusive and that some conduct
might come within either subsection (A) or (B) of 42 U.S.C.
section 1396h(b)(2). 
'
82
With the judicial expansion of the existing Kickback Statutes
after 1980, the ground work was laid for the prosecution of
conduct deemed illegal because of its potential to create eco-
nomic inducement for referrals. An example of such a case is
the Third Circuit's decision in United States v. Greber. 3 The
1, 650 F.2d at 227. Offer of a bribe is defined as "a representation expressing an
ability and desire to pay a remuneration coupled with the intent to induce a desired
action." Corbin defined "offer" as an expression by one party of his assent to certain
definite terms, provided that the other party involved in the bargaining transaction will
likewise express his assent to the identical same terms. A.L. CoRaN, CoRBIN ON CON-
TRAcTS, § 11, at 16 (1952).
" 650 F.2d 1044. The court found that, although the indictment cited 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396h(b)(2)(A) (1982) rather than 42 U.S.C. § 1396h(b)(2)(B) (1982), "an indictment
charging a defendant with offering remuneration as an inducement for referral of
'individuals' would not support a conviction based upon referral of laboratory work
... this indictment referred to the referral of 'work' rather than individuals." Id. at
1046.
" 695 F.2d at 1153-54 n.3. The court, refusing to follow Stewart, 652 F.2d 804,
stated that,
In the Stewart case, the evidence showed that the kickback scheme called
for the clinic to send the patients' specimens to the laboratory for testing.
No patients were to visit the defendant's laboratory. The court said that it
would be a "tortured construction of the statutory language" to interpret
"referring an individual" to include sending specimens of an individual.
[citation omitted] .... There is no fatal variance in this case because the
evidence shows the remuneration was offered to induce the clinic to order
the defendant's laboratory services. The patient 'referrals' in this case were
only incidental to the main plan, since the clinic's remuneration was to be
calculated as a percentage of the gross billings of the laboratory, it was the
number of tests ordered, not the number of patients referred, that determined
the amount to be paid.
Id. at 1153-54. But see supra note 81.
11 760 F.2d 68 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 396 (1985).
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defendant in Greber was a doctor who had set up a company
to install monitors on heart patients. The company also removed
the monitors twenty-four hours after their installation and sent
reports to the referring doctors. The carrier for Medicare, Penn-
sylvania Blue Shield, utilized a three-part payment system for
this process that consisted of payments for installation, scanning,
and interpretation of the test. The referring doctors merely signed
the reports and received the portion of the fee that covered the
costs of interpretation. Concluding that these interpretation fees
were improper, the Third Circuit stated that "the more expansive
reading [of remuneration] is consistent with the impetus for the
1977 amendments.... If the payments were intended to induce
the physician to use Cardio-Med's services, the statute was vio-
lated, even if the payments were also intended to compensate
for professional services.' '84
Unfortunately, by focusing on the 1977 amendments, the
Third Circuit disregarded not only the restrictive effect of the
1980 amendment, but also ignored changes made in the Medicaid
reimbursement system in 1982 at the request of the Executive
Branch.' 5 The previous effect of the factually similar Hancock
case86 was merely to broaden the scope of conduct prohibited
by the Kickback Statutes as amended in 1977. By disregarding
post-1980 changes in legislative intent and executive policy, the
Third Circuit's identical holding in Greber will have a radically
different effect from that of Hancock.
III. EFFECT OF THE EXPANDED KICKBACK STATUTES AFTER
THE INTRODUCTION OF THE PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM
Originally, the Medicare-Medicaid programs utilized a fee-
for-service 7 reimbursement system whereby health care provi-
ders,8" treating program beneficiaries, were reimbursed by private
Id. at 72,
SVance-Bryan, Medicare's Prospective Payment System: Can Quality Care Sur-
vive? 69 IowA L. REv. 1417, 1418 (1984). The exorbitant costs of Medicare in 1983
"coupled with the worsening plight of the federal budget, combined to create a political
demand for reform of Medicare's repayment system." Id.
16 See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
7 "Whenever a program beneficiary receives a service, the provider bills for
payment." Laudicina & Schneider, supra note 32, at 843.
" "Health care providers" include hospitals, nursing homes, doctors, etc. Id.
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insurers upon submission of a receipted bill for reasonable costs. 9
The system was designed so that health care providers were taken
at their word when they filed their claims for reimbursement. 90
In addition to providing a means of fraud and abuse, this
retrospective reimbursement system offered hospitals no incen-
tive to provide cost efficient health care and significantly con-
tributed to the increase in Medicare spending from $5 billion in
1965 to over $72 billion in 1983.91
As an incentive to hospitals to provide more cost efficient
health care, section 1886 was added to the Social Security Act,
thereby creating what is known as the prospective payment sys-
tem ["PPS"].92 Under PPS, hospitals are paid a fixed amount
of money for each diagnosis, 93 in constrast to the fee-for-service
system under which hospitals are reimbursed for care given to
Medicare-Medicaid in-patients .94 Because section 1886 allows the
hospital to retain the difference between the fixed PPS amount
and its actual costs, hospitals are encouraged to operate more
efficiently. 95 Thus, hospitals that reduce in-patient costs most
effectively will be more competitive under PPS and will be able
to offer lower rates to their privately paying patients. The Med-
icare-Medicaid programs also benefit because Medicaid patients,
who are seen as out-patients and billed on a fee-for-service basis,
will be charged less for the same services.
96
Act of July 30, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 1965 U.S. CODE & CONG. ArKnn. NEws
1943, 1949. A reasonable charge is "the customary charge for similar services generally
made by the physician or other person or organization furnishing the covered services, and
also the prevailing charges for the locality for similar services." Id. at 1949.
* Plymale, supra note 30, at N-4.
Kusserow, supra note 3, at 986.
Act of Sept. 3, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324. See 48 Fed. Reg. 39,426
(1983). "The new system ... is primarily intended to provide incentives to hospitals to
manage their operations in a more cost effective manner." Id. at 39,752. "Section 1886
restricts Medicare reimbursements for in-patient hospital services by extending hospital
cost-per-basis limits to cover all in-patient operating costs and by requiring that a ceiling
be placed on a hospital's rate of increase in in-patient operating cost per case." Vance-
Bryan, supra note 85, at 1419.
48 Fed. Reg. at 39,754.
I' Id.
Id.
* Intermediary Letter 84-9, from Richard P. Krusserow, Inspector General, De-
partment of Health & Human Services, to Assistant Attorney General Stephen S. Trott,
1986-87]
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In legislating the 1977 and 1980 amendments, which broad-
ened the original Kickback Statutes to encompass more diverse
types of conduct and restricted the amended Kickback Statutes
by requiring that the perpetrator possess a specific intent to
defraud, Congress apparently felt, in adopting the PPS, that
sufficient safeguards were in place to prevent fraud and abuse.
In fact, some business practices being encouraged under the PPS
might have been subject to prosecution prior to the 1980 amend-
ment. PPS reimbursement, although not completely eliminating
the possibility of fraud and abuse, automatically prevents certain
questionable business practices, previously controlled by the
amended Kickback Statutes, from becoming devices for fraud
and abuse. For example, the design of the PPS prevents a group
purchasing agent97 from engaging in fraudulent conduct. No such
built-in controls were present in the fee-for-service reimburse-
ment system. With the fee-for-service reimbursement system re-
lying primarily on the amended Kickback Statutes to prevent
fraud and abuse and the PPS's relying on cost-saving incentives
and the existing Kickback Statutes to prevent fraud and abuse,
two apparently contradictory reimbursement systems are in place
at the same time. Unfortunately, the courts, as demonstrated by
the Greber decision, are incorrectly applying the principles and
policies of the fee-for-service reimbursement system to the PPS,
preventing the PPS from accomplishing the goals for which it
was created. The result is that business practices authorized and
encouraged by the Executive branch and adopted by the Legis-
lative branch are being prohibited wrongfully by the Judicial
branch.
An example of one major problem, yet to be adequately
resolved, exists where a doctor is a limited partner in a partner-
ship which owns a clinical laboratory or a medical supply store.
If that doctor refers one of his patients to that laboratory or
store and, as a result of that referral, the doctor receives a profit
(notwithstanding that there is only one clinical laboratory or
Department of Justice (dated April, 1985), [1984 Transfer Binder - Current Develop-
ments] Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 34,127.
11 A group purchasing agent is a person used by a group of hospitals to obtain
agreements with vendors for the sale of a wide variety of equipment, supplies, and
services to member hospitals. Id.
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medical supply store in the area), under Greber, an overzealous
prosecutor might charge the doctor with receiving an illegal
kickback and succeed in obtaining a conviction. Therefore, a
doctor must either risk prosecution or refrain from referring any
Medicare-Medicaid patient to any business in which the doctor
has any interest. In light of the penalties, doctors must either
refuse to participate in the ownership of businesses that serve
Medicare or Medicaid patients or refuse to treat such patients.
The latter option certainly would protect the doctor but may
rob Medicare-Medicaid patients of the expertise of many quali-
fied physicians. Also, the practices, wrongfully prohibited by the
Judicial branch, could save money for hospitals, private paying
patients, and Medicare-Medicaid patients. 98
CONCLUSION
Analysis of United States v. Greber9 and the legislative
development of the existing Kickback Statutes reveals that, after
attempting for 15 years to prevent the loss of funds from Social
Security, the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial branches do
not agree regarding the existing Kickback Statutes' function,
operation or scope.'00 A comprehensive review of the sections of
the Medicare-Medicaid programs that govern the methods and
means of health care delivery is needed to give doctors greater
freedom in referrals and thus provide more efficient services for
Medicare-Medicaid patients by eliminating barriers that often
keep those patients from benefitting from these programs. That
review should involve all three branches of government and
should define clearly what kinds of conduct the Executive branch
should prosecute and how broadly the Judicial branch should
interpret the existing Kickback Statutes.
Prior to the 1980 amendment, a three year period of judicial
expansion 1' of the amended Kickback Statutes occurred, cul-
minating in United States v. Hancock.02 Following the 1980
Id.
760 F.2d 68 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 396 (1985).
See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 54-69 and accompanying text.
102 604 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1979).
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amendment, which restricted the application of the amended
Kickback Statutes, a second period of judicial expansion of the
existing Kickback Statutes occurred, ending with Greber.'03 The
first period of judicial expansion was understandable, consider-
ing the reasons for which Congress passed the original Kickback
Statutes in 1977. It was clearly Congress' intent, however, in
their 1980 amendments, to restrict the application of the Kick-
back Statutes.' 4 Nevertheless, the Judicial branch has disre-
garded the intent of both Congress and the Executive branch by
continuing to interpret the existing Kickback Statutes broadly.10
Such interpretations have created a direct conflict between stat-
utes designed to provide medical assistance to congressionally
designated individuals and statutes designed to protect the Med-
icare-Medicaid programs from fraud and abuse.
That portion of the Social Security laws concerned with the
prevention of fraud and abuse in the delivery of health care has
been revised by Congress in a manner that consistently allows
for our society's constantly changing social needs and policies
and allows health care providers to function in a competitive
and rapidly changing health care delivery system which is mark-
edly different from that which prevailed when the Medicare-
Medicaid programs were created almost two decades ago. The
judiciary should follow this lead and apply the laws in that same
spirit, instead of clinging to older notions which are no longer
valid under the new PPS system.
Stephen C. Pierce
101 Sge supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
114 See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
1o See supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text.
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